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I. Introduction 
 
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Department of Justice v. Reporters 
Committee for Freedom of the Press dramatically altered the treatment of federal 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)1 requests implicating privacy interests.  Certainly 
the Court's decision had a dramatic impact on the balancing of privacy interests and the 
public interest in governmental transparency. The Court's opinion in Reporters 
Committee is most often noted for its conclusion that the FOIA's core purpose was to 
shed light on governmental activities and operations and for its assertion that disclosure 
of personal information seldom accomplishes that goal. 
Lost in the debate over Reporters Committee, however, is the Court's creation of the 
concept of "practical obscurity," the idea that records once stored in separate repositories 
scattered throughout the halls of government are transformed by computerization into 
new record forms that implicate privacy interests in new ways. Indeed, the ease and speed 
with which the personal computer can synthesize disparate records, and the universal 
access to the records created by the Internet, create novel issues for freedom of 
information law. In its initial look at the issue, the Reporters Committee Court opted for a 
                                                 
1See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).    
     
bright-line test: information in federal records that is "about the government" is public, 
and information about individuals is not.  
As the cases following Reporters Committee have shown, records rarely fall into such 
neat categories. In fact, information about individuals can, and often does, shed light on 
governmental operations and activities. Since Reporters Committee, lower courts facing 
the issue of access versus privacy have almost universally found that records 
documenting governmental involvement in ways that involve personal information about 
those involved in government programs, or even federal investigations of alleged 
wrongdoing, should be protected by the privacy Exemption 6 or by Exemption 7(c) of the 
FOIA, which applies privacy law to law enforcement records. The result is a body of law 
that treats information as if it falls into one category or the other, when nothing could be 
further from reality. 
At the heart of this doctrine is the notion of practical obscurity, the Court's belief that 
public records should be public so long as they are separated by geographic distance and 
antiquated paper-based systems. Practical obscurity also gives rise to the assumption that 
computerized compilations of once-obscure records transforms public records into 
private data thanks merely to the ease with which such records can now be accessed. 
This paper will demonstrate how the Court’s decision in Reporters Committee -- 
specifically its formulation of the "central purpose" of the FOIA2 and its embrace of 
practical obscurity -- holds far-reaching implications for federal access law. Examination 
of Reporters Committee and of more than 60 lower federal court opinions relying in 
whole or in part upon the Court’s "central purpose" formulation in Reporters Committee 
show that the Court has sharply limited the ambit of information that can be released 
under the Freedom of Information Act.3  Finally, this paper will offer an alternative to the 
Reporters Committee doctrine created through a line of cases addressing similar issues in 
the context of the Privacy Act, a close legislative cousin of the FOIA, that offers a 
compromise of sorts between privacy and access. 
 
II. Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press 
 
Reporters Committee presented a question crucial to the emergence of electronic access: 
Could an agency invoke privacy concerns to deny access to public records compiled 
electronically, for no other reason than that they were compiled electronically? Does the 
mere compilation of data give rise to otherwise non-existent privacy concerns? In 
addressing these questions, the Court issued its first opinion on the relationship between 
access and privacy, indicating a clear preference for a narrower application of the FOIA. 
The case arose after a reporter filed a FOIA request4 asking for the FBI’s "rap sheet" on 
Charles Medico, a businessman identified by the Pennsylvania Crime Commission as an 
owner of Medico Industries, a legitimate business dominated by organized-crime 
figures.5 The reporter was investigating Medico because Medico’s company received 
defense contracts allegedly in exchange for political contributions to U.S. Rep. Daniel J. 
                                                                                                                                                 
2 See Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, at 774.  
 
3 See S. REP. NO. 104-272, at 26-27 (Statement by Sen. Leahy)(1996); Reporters Comm. for Freedom of 
the Press, Report on Responses and Non-Response of the Executive and Judicial Branches to Congress’ 
Finding that the FOI Act Serves ‘Any Purpose’ 2-3 (July 2, 1998).  
 
4See 489 U.S. at 757. 
 
5See id. 
 
Flood.6 Flood, who eventually left office in disgrace, already was under investigation for 
corruption.7  
  The FBI released information on three of Charles Medico’s brothers, all 
deceased, but the agency refused to release Charles Medico’s rap sheet on privacy 
grounds because he was still alive.8 The reporter sued to gain access to the records, but 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted the FBI’s motion for 
summary judgment to dismiss the suit. The court held that the information was protected 
under the privacy provision of the FOIA’s law enforcement exemption,9 and that 
disclosure of the records would be an unwarranted invasion of Charles Medico’s 
privacy.10  
On appeal, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled in favor of the 
CBS journalist and Reporters Committee. The appeals court reasoned that the 
government can not claim a privacy interest in an FBI compilation of law enforcement 
agency records when those same records would be available as public records from the 
individual agencies themselves.11 
                                                 
6See id.  
  
7See Laura Kiernan, Flood Is Placed on Year’s Probation, THE WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 1980, at A8.  
 
8See 489 U.S. at 757. 
 
9See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)7(C)(1994). The exemption states that the FOIA does not apply to matters that are 
“(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the 
production of such law enforcement records or information (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute 
an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Exemption 7(C) is one of two privacy exceptions to the 
FOIA. The other exception, Exemption 6, pertains to “personnel and medical files and similar files the 
disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” See id. § 552 
(b)6. 
 
10See 489 U.S. at 757-59.  
 
11See Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 816 F.2d 730, 740 (1987). 
The Department of Justice appealed to the Supreme Court, which balanced the 
individual’s right of privacy against the public interest in disclosure and reversed the 
appellate court ruling, thus allowing the FBI to withhold the information.12 Writing for 
the Court, Justice John Paul Stevens said the FOIA’s “central purpose is to ensure that the 
government’s activities be opened to the sharp eye of public scrutiny, not that 
information about private citizens that happens to be in the warehouse of the government 
be so disclosed.”13 The Court reasoned that because a computerized compilation of an 
individual’s rap sheet does not directly shed light on governmental performance, it falls 
“outside the ambit of the public interest that the FOIA was enacted to serve.”14 The 
requested FBI records would “tell us nothing directly about the character of the 
Congressman’s behavior,” Justice Stevens wrote.15 “Nor would it tell us anything about 
the conduct of the Department of Defense in awarding one or more contracts to the 
Medico Company.”16 
Certainly one could argue that Medico's rap sheet would provide details to embolden a 
news story, but the Court reasoned that this is not the kind of public interest for which 
Congress enacted the FOIA. So, while doubtless there exist some public interest in 
anyone's criminal history, especially if that history details the subject's relationship with 
                                                 
 
12See 489 U.S. at 772-73 (citing 425 U.S. at 372.) 
  
13See 489 U.S. at 774. 
 
14See id. at 775. 
 
15See id. at 774. 
 
16See id. 
 
governmental officials or agencies, the FOIA's central purpose -- scrutiny of government 
-- forestalls such inquiry. 
Of particular interest to this paper is the Court's treatment of the technology involved in 
compilations. According to the Court, a citizen possesses a protected privacy interest in 
the criminal history information because "plainly there is a vast difference between the 
public records that might be found after a diligent search of courthouse files, county 
archives, and local police stations throughout the country and a computerized summary 
located in a single clearinghouse of information."17 Thus, individuals maintain a privacy 
interest in the "practical obscurity" of records.18 
Taken literally, this means that public documents that are difficult or time-consuming to 
locate essentially become private records. And when those hard-to-find documents are 
assembled electronically, they implicate privacy interests in new ways. Writing shortly 
after the Court's decision, the noted FOIA expert Harry A. Hammitt posed the following 
scenario: 
Say, for example, that a news organization sent reporters to courthouses and police 
stations around the country to retrieve public criminal-history records -- arrests, 
convictions, and sentences. 
The news organization could then computerize the information so reporters could enter a 
name and call up a profile of that individual's criminal history. Since all the information 
is admittedly public, such a private database would not invade anyone's privacy, at least 
not legally. 
                                                 
17 Id. at 764. 
 
18 Id. 
 
But when government does the same thing with its computers, according to the Court's 
ruling, an overarching concern for privacy suddenly sweeps away the public nature of the 
information and dramatically restricts the scope of the FOIA.19   
 The restructuring of the FOIA in Reporters Committee through the lens of the 
"core purpose" test, coupled with the Court's creation of "practical obscurity," clearly 
demonstrates that the burden of proof in privacy-related cases now rests with the 
requester rather than with the government. Instead of a presumption of openness, there 
now exists a requirement that the requester show that the information sought will reveal -
- directly -- something about governmental operations. 
 Where governmental operations intersect with the lives of citizens -- and they do, 
daily, at the federal, state and local level -- should individuals reasonably expect that 
those dealings will always be private? If so, then a prime purpose of the FOIA, the 
exposure of fraud, waste and abuse by government, has been tossed aside in favor a 
reflexive privacy right that seemingly has no end in sight. 
 Predictably enough, lower courts have faithfully followed the Reporters 
Committee doctrine, holding in a steadily growing line of cases that the "central purpose" 
test limits the disclosure of a wide variety of documents, most electronically compiled, 
that identify individuals.20 Judges used the “central purpose” analysis in FOIA litigation 
                                                 
19 Harry A. Hammitt, "High Court Alchemy," The Quill, Vol. 7, No. 9, 28, 29 (Oct. 1989). 
 
20See The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Report on Responses and Non-Response of the 
Executive and Judicial Branches to Congress’ Finding That the FOI Act Serves “Any Purpose,” prepared 
by request of the Chairman, Subcommittee on Government Management, Information and Technology of 
the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, July 2, 1998. See, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers 
International Ass’n, Local 19 v. U.S. Dep’t of Veteran Affairs, 135 F.3d 891 (3d Cir. 1998); Kimberlin v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 139 F.3d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1998); McQueen v. United States, 179F.R.D.522 (S.D. Tex. 
1998); Ligorner v. Reno, 2 F.Supp.2d 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Lurie v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 970 F. Supp. 
19 (D.D.C. 1997); Center to Prevent Handgun Violence v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 981 F. Supp. 20 
(D.D.C. 1997); Sheet Metal Workers International Ass’n, Local 9 v. U.S. Air Force, 63 F.3d 994 (10th Cir. 
involving the FOIA privacy exemptions -- Exemptions 6 and 7(C)21 -- because invasion 
of privacy was the central issue in Reporters Committee. However, several courts have 
used the Reporters Committee test22 in FOIA cases involving issues that go beyond the 
Act’s privacy exemptions.23 
                                                                                                                                                 
1995); Manna v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 51 F.3d 1158 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 477 (1995); 
Exner v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice F. Supp. 240 (D.D.C. 1995); Jones v. FBI, 41 F.3d 238 (6th Cir. 1994); U.S. 
Dep’t of the Navy v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 975 F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1992); Hunt v. FBI, 972 
F.2d 286 (9th Cir. 1992); and Hale v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 973 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1992).   
                    
21See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)6 & (b)7(C)(1994). The statutory language of privacy Exemptions 6 and 7(C) 
reflect two key differences. First, Exemption 6 calls for “a clearly unwarranted invasion” of privacy (italics 
added). See id. Exemption 7 requires a less strict standard, asking an agency to show only “an unwarranted 
invasion of privacy.” See id. § 552 (b)7(C). Second, Exemption 6 applies to information that, if disclosed, 
“would constitute” an invasion of privacy (italics added). See id. § 552 (b)6. Exemption 7, on the other 
hand, applies to information the disclosure of which “could reasonably be expected to constitute” an 
invasion of privacy (italics added). See id. § 552 (b)7(C). 
   The legislative history shows that the difference in language was intentional. Exemption 7(C), as 
originally proposed by Sen. Gary Hart, also required a “clearly” unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. 
See 120 CONG. REC. 17033 (1974). However, the word “clearly” was dropped by the Conference 
Committee as a concession in negotiations with President Ford to get the Act approved. See CONF. REP. 
NO. 93-1380, at 11 (1974). By dropping “clearly,” the Exemption lessened the agency’s burden to meet the 
test. See JAMES T. O’REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE: PROCEDURES, FORMS AND THE LAW § 
17.09, at 13-44 (1994). Legislators also agreed to the difference in language between “would” in 
Exemption 6, and “could reasonably be expected” in Exemption 7(C) in order enact the legislation. Courts 
have consequently concluded that Exemption 7(C) allows law enforcement officers more latitude to 
withhold records to protect privacy than is permitted under the stricter standard of Exemption 6. See U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 755-756 (1989). In addition, 
Exemption 7(C) means the public interest in disclosure carries less weight. See id.  
   When judges make a determination in a privacy-interests case under Exemption 7(C), the courts use a 
two-step test. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)7(C). First, the documents must have been compiled for law 
enforcement reasons because this Exemption pertains only to investigative records.  Second, the 
government must prove that the disclosure could “reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted 
invasion of privacy.” See id. Similarly, the courts use a similar test in deciding an Exemption 6 privacy-
interests case. The courts first must determine if the records falls within the definition of “personnel,” 
“medical” or “similar” files. See id. § 552(b)6. Second, the courts must balance the invasion of the 
individual’s personal privacy against the public benefit that would result from disclosure. To withhold 
information, the government must show that the disclosure “would constitute a clearly unwarranted 
invasion of privacy.” See id. See also U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 382 (1972).  
 
22See 489 U.S. at 774-75. 
 
23See Christopher P. Beall, The Exaltation of Privacy Doctrines Over Public Information Law, 45 DUKE 
L.J. 1249, 1273 (1996). Beall cited three cases in which courts have broadened the applicability of the 
central purpose doctrine. See id. at 1273-80. See Sweetland v. Walters, 60 F.3d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1995)(per 
curiam)(holding that the Executive Residence staff of the White House is not an “agency” under the 
FOIA); Baizer v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, 887 F. Supp. 225 (N.D. Cal. 1995)(holding that an electronic 
copy of the Air Force’s computerized database of Supreme Court opinions should not be considered an 
“agency record” under the FOIA); Vazquez-Gonzalez v. Shalala, Civ. No. 94-2100 (SEC)(D.P.R. Feb. 13, 
1995)(dismissing a suit brought by a physician, who sought information about Medicare billing practices, 
 In all of these cases, courts after Reporters Committee have closely scrutinized 
public interest assertions. The federal courts narrowly define the "central purpose" of the 
FOIA as records that will shed light on agency performance directly. The analysis does 
not extend to the question of whether the records will facilitate reportage, and instead 
limits the public interest inquiry to the contents of the records themselves. Indeed, where 
documents have been sought largely for the personal information they contained, the 
courts have been protective of privacy interests unless the public interest is overriding. In 
fact, one federal court has said that the public interest argument is insubstantial unless the 
requester "puts forward compelling evidence that the agency denying the FOIA request is 
engaged in illegal activity and shows that the information sought is necessary to confirm 
or refute that evidence."24 
 The concept of "practical obscurity" as an interest mitigating toward privacy is 
seldom discussed in these post-Reporters Committee cases, but the notion certainly 
thrives within the "central purpose" doctrine. The cases present an overall picture of a 
federal judiciary actively reigning in citizen access to the information collected and 
compiled by government. The fact that much of that information is compiled, stored and 
disseminated through computer networks leads to the logical conclusion that the more 
government documents created electronically, the greater the "practical obscurity" of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
because the requested information concerned the plaintiff’s own commercial interests). See Beall, at 1273-
80. 
 
24 See Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility v. Secret Service, 72 F.3d 897, 904-05 (D.C.Cir. 
1996). See also Accuracy in Media, Inc. v. National Park Service, 194 F.3d 120, 124 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. 
denied, 68 U.S.L.W. 3711 (May 15, 2000) (inconsistencies in crime scene reports are "hardly so shocking 
as to suggest illegality or deliberate government falsification."); SafeCard Services Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 
1197 (D.D.C. 1991) ("Indeed, unless there is compelling evidence that the agency denying the FOIA 
request is engaged in illegal activity…there is no reason to believe that the incremental public interest in 
such information would ever be significant.") 
 
data. Despite the revolutionary ability of the computer, and of the Internet, to make 
information more readily available to the citizenry, "practical obscurity" stands ready to 
limit its vast potential to democratize information.  
 At the heart of "practical obscurity" is the Court's new categorical approach in 
cases involving privacy claims. To the Reporters Committee Court, information is either 
about individuals or about government; when the two categories blend, the result, in the 
Court's view, should almost always be non-disclosure. Neither life, nor data, is ever quite 
so simple. A more reasoned approach does exist, however, in a line of cases interpreting 
the Privacy Act, a statute closely related to the FOIA. 
 
The Privacy Act Approach: When is a record "about" an individual? 
 
 Enacted in the wake of the Watergate scandal of 1974, the Privacy Act is an 
important yet little-known statute.25 It represents a measured response by Congress to the 
public's concern that the federal government was gathering vast amounts of data about 
individuals and that the data might be in ways that threatened personal privacy.26 The 
Privacy Act was designed as a protector of personal privacy against the potential 
government misuse of information.27 The Act specified that its purpose was "to provide 
certain safeguards against an invasion of personal privacy," through the fulfillment of six 
                                                 
25 For commentary on the Privacy Act, see, e.g., Todd Robert Coles, Comment, "Does the Privacy Act of 
1974 Protect Your Right to Privacy," 40 Am. U. L. Rev. 957 (1991);  
 
26 Note, "The Privacy Act of 1974: An Overview and Critique," 1976 Wash. U. L.Q. 667, 669-70. 
 
27 Cornish F. Hitchcock, "Overview of the Privacy Act," in Justin D. Franklin and Robert E. Bouchard, 
Guidebook to the Federal Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts, § 2.02, 2-18.3 (Supp. 2001) 
(hereinafter cited as Guidebook).  
 
guiding provisions.28As a statute aimed at protecting the right of the people to maintain 
some degree of control over information the government collects about them, it can be 
viewed as the legislative counter to the FOIA.  
  The Privacy Act of 1974 attempted to strike a delicate balance between the 
government's need to gather and to use personal information and the individual's 
competing interest in maintaining control over such personal information. Broadly stated, 
the Act requires every federal agency maintaining a record on an individual within a 
system of records to: (1) permit the individual to control the use and dissemination of 
information contained in the record; (2) permit the individual to review, to correct, or to 
amend information contained in the record; (3) regulate and restrict the collection, 
maintenance, use, and dissemination of information in the record; and (4) be subject to 
civil suit for specified violations of the Privacy Act.29 Collectively, these safeguards are 
designed to protect individual privacy, while preserving the government's ability to 
gather and to use personal information. 
 A key question under the Privacy Act, then, is what records are subject to the 
various provisions of the Act. The statute defines a "record" as follows: 
 …any item, collection, or grouping of information about an individual that is 
maintained by an agency, including, but not limited to his education, financial 
transactions, medical history, and criminal or employment history, and that contains his 
                                                 
28 The provisions are as follows: 1. Individuals would be permitted to determine what records pertaining to 
themselves were collected, maintained, used or disseminated by federal agencies. 2. Individuals would be 
able to prevent records about themselves that an agency had obtained for one purpose from being used for 
another purpose without the person's prior consent. 3. Individuals could not only gain access to records an 
agency has on them, but could also have the information corrected or amended. 4. Agencies were required 
to make sure that information about individuals was current and accurate. 5. Agencies were exempted from 
the requirements of the Act "only in those cases where there is an important public policy need for such 
exemption" as specified in the Act. 6. Agencies would be subject to a lawsuit for any damages that occur as 
a result of willful or intentional acts which violate any person's rights under the Act. See Pub. L. No. 93-
579, § 2(b), 88 Stat. 1897 (1974). 
 
29 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (1988). 
 
name, or the identifying number, symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the 
individual, such as a finger or voice print or a photograph.30 
 
 Such a definition obviously has a broad sweep, applying not only to records 
containing a person's name, but also to any other document, regardless of physical form, 
that could be used to identify someone. In fact, the legislative language accompanying 
the compromise version of the Act upon its passage specified that the term "record" was 
defined so as "to assure that the intent that a record can include as little as one descriptive 
item about an individual."31 
 As further evidence of the breadth of the term "record," the Office of 
Management and Budget, the agency with executive oversight of the Privacy Act, states 
in its Privacy Act Guidelines that the term means "any" item of information about an 
individual.32  The OMB Guidelines point out that prohibitions on the on the disclosure of 
a record may apply not only to the entire record in its compiled state, but also to any item 
within that record set, provided that the record set contains an individual identifier.33   
 Consistent with the OMB Guidelines, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
held that the term "record" "encompasses any information about an individual that is 
linked to that individual through an identifying particular."34 Such a construction 
resembles the United States Supreme Court's reasoning in Reporters Committee: if a 
record in any way identifies an individual, privacy rights are implicated. 
                                                 
30 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(4) (1988). 
 
31 120 Cong. Rec. 40, 408 (1974). 
 
32 40 Fed. Reg. 28,948, 28,951 (1975). 
 
33 40 Fed. Reg. 28,951 (1975). 
 
34 Quinn v. Stone, 978 F.2d 126, 133 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 Perhaps sensing the limitless scope of a Privacy Act guided by such logic, the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in 1994 limited its reach by adopting a 
narrow construction of the term "record." The court's more detailed textual analysis of the 
Act's definition of "record" in Tobey v. National Labor Relations Board35 suggests that a 
record may not be "about" someone for purposes of the Act merely because the document 
contains the person's name or other identifier. 
 Tobey involved a computer system used by the National Labor Relations Board 
for tracking the progress of its cases. One of the fields in the system was for the initials of 
the field examiner assigned to each case.36 Apparently, the board has traditionally used 
the system to prepare its annual report to Congress.  
 The plaintiff in Tobey worked for the NLRB as a field examiner. In connection 
with a grievance arbitration, an NLRB official conducted a search of the system using his 
initials to pull up his caseload, days worked and other information.37 The plaintiff 
brought suit in district court against the NLRB under the Privacy Act, alleging that the 
NLRB maintained and used a system of records to retrieve personal information about 
him and disclosed that information to others without his consent.38 The district court 
found that the NLRB had not met the notice requirements of the Privacy Act but 
concluded that the data retrieved were not "records" within the meaning of the Act.39 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
35 40 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
 
36 Id. at 470. 
 
37 Id. at 471. 
 
38 Id. 
 
39 Id., citing Tobey v. NLRB, 807 F. Supp. 798, 800-01 (D.D.C. 1992). 
 
 On appeal, Tobey argued that the district court improperly defined "record," and 
argued that the information disseminated by the NLRB was "about" him because it 
contained identifiers linking him to the information.40  
 Rather than summarily conclude that any and all information that includes an 
individual identifier automatically meets the definition of "record" under the Act, the 
court instead turned to statutory text.41 First, the records must be "about an individual"; 
second, they must contain an identifying number, symbol or other particular.42 The court 
reasoned that the second requirement leads to an obvious conclusion about the first: the 
mere inclusion of an identifier does not mean that the information necessarily is "about" 
the individual. If it did, there would be no need for the first prong of the statute. Thus, the 
court concluded that in order to meet the statutory definition of "record," the information 
must include some identifying information that is "about" the individual.43 This 
conclusion led the court toward a more substantive evaluation of the nature of the 
information. 
 To determine whether the information in the NLRB CHIPS system was "about" 
Tobey, the court examined the use of the data in question. Because the database was used 
to maintain status reports on NLRB cases rather than on individual employees, the court 
concluded that the database held no information about individuals sufficient to trigger 
Privacy Act protections.44 Rather, they contained information such as case name, 
                                                 
40 Id. 
 
41 Id. 
 
42 Id. at 470-71. For the statutory language, see 5 U.S.C. § 552a (a) (5) (1998). 
 
43 Id. at 471. 
 
44 Id. at 471. 
allegations made, the number of private-sector employees involved and the dates of 
hearings, settlements and dismissals.45 
 Admittedly, the system also includes the number and initials of the field examiner 
assigned to the case, but the court reasoned that "this no more means the information is 
'about' the individual than it means the information is 'about' the date on which the case is 
settled.46 Thus, the court construed the Privacy Act protects information that is "about" an 
individual, not that which simply "identifies" an individual. The latter category is a broad 
one, encompassing virtually all data relating to an individual; the former, however, 
includes only information that "actually describes" the individual.47 In other words, the 
mere possibility that NLRB officials could use data from CHIPS in combination with 
other information to draw inferences about his job performance did not transform the data 
into "records" protected by the Privacy Act.48 
 Tobey has proven influential in shaping this area of Privacy Act law, but the 
federal courts still are mostly divided over the textual approach in determining when 
information becomes a "record" for purposes of the Act.49 For example, in Bechhoefer v. 
Department of Justice,50 a citizen wrote to the Drug Enforcement Administration 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
45 Id. 472. 
 
46 Id. 
 
47 Id. 
 
48 Id. at 473. 
 
49 See, e.g., Fisher v. National Insts. Of Health, 934 F. Supp. 464 (D.D.C. 1996) (legend appended to NIH 
database were about the articles in the database, and not about the authors); but see also Becchoefer v. 
Department of Justice, 209 F.3d 57 (2d Cir. 2000), revsg Bechhoefer v. Department of Justice, 934 F. Supp. 
535 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (letter concerning alleged drug dealers was about the author since it contained name, 
address, telephone number, etc.). 
 
50 934 F. Supp. 535 (W.D.N.Y. 1996). 
suggesting that individuals connected to a local sheriff's office were involved in narcotics 
trafficking.  
 A DEA agent sent the letter to the sheriff, and the author was charged with 
making false statements (a charge that was later dropped).51 The author filed suit under 
the Privacy Act to sanction the release of the letter, but the trial court, relying on Tobey, 
concluded that the letter was not "about" the author, but about the suspected drug 
dealers.52  
 The Second Circuit reversed the Western District of New York in an opinion 
critical of the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Tobey.53 The Bechhoefer panel identified three 
approaches to identifying a "record" under the Privacy Act:54 (a) Tobey's analysis that the 
information must actually describe the individual in some way;55 (b) the more exapnsive 
view in the Ninth and Eleventh circuits that the information must "reflect some quality or 
characteristic of the individual involved";56 and the Third Circuit's definition in a 1992 
case that a record encompasses "any information about an individual that is linked to the 
individual through an identifying particular."57 
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 The Bechhoefer panel followed the third approach as most consistent with the 
statutory definition of "record," concluding that the Act contains no language suggesting 
that the information must reflect a "quality or characteristic" of the individual.58 Since the 
letter at issue contained the plaintiff's name, address and other identifying information, it 
was deemed a "record" about him.59 
 The conflict in approach between the federal circuit courts in defining "records" 
under the Privacy Act merits further scrutiny, and could lead the United States Supreme 
Court to settle the issue in a future case. Indeed, it is unclear whether future cases will be 
decided under one standard rather than another. The information in Tobey, for example -- 
case-tracking documents -- likely would not meet even the narrower standard of 
Bechhoefer because they did not deal with any personal information about the employee, 
unlike the letter in Bechhoefer, which did. 
 It is clear, however, that courts construing the Privacy Act have adopted a much 
more flexible approach in sifting through privacy claims than have courts construing the 
Freedom of Information Act. While the Privacy Act cases focus on a critical examination 
of the nature and uses of data, the influence of the Reporters Committee Court on the 
FOIA has created a reactive judicial philosophy that favors closure over disclosure. 
 
The Post-Reporters Committee Landscape: McNamera v. Department of Justice   
 
                                                 
58 209 F.3d 57, at 61. 
 
59 Id. at 62. 
 
A close look at a typical post-Reporters Committee decision illustrates the many 
problems of FOIA requests implicating privacy interests and offers a framework for 
applying the textual analysis common to many Privacy Act determinations of when a 
record is "about" an individual. In McNamera v. Department of Justice,60 a federal 
district court denied a journalist access to records concerning the investigation and 
prosecution of a West Texas sheriff in a notorious case, ignoring strong public-interest 
arguments by relying on the Reporters Committee "central purpose" rationale. 
In McNamera, a journalist sought access to records concerning a rather 
spectacular story: a sheriff convicted for helping a drug-runner smuggle 2,421 pounds of 
cocaine -- with a street value of $1.1 billion -- into the United States.61 Two years after 
his conviction, the journalist McNamera requested from the Department of Justice 
records concerning the case. McNamera's request stated that he was especially interested 
in information that disclosed "agency procedures and the working[s] of government."62 
Despite the widespread public attention in the case and its rather obvious link to 
governmental investigatory techniques, the court found that McNamera's request had not 
raised legitimate questions about government action, stating that in order to trigger the 
sort of public interest that would outweigh privacy concerns, the request must "put 
forward compelling evidence" that the agency involved is engaged in illegal activity.63 To 
the court, the request for law enforcement records does little, if anything, to advance 
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knowledge of the workings of government, unless the requester could present a prima 
facie case of illegality.64 
McNamera argued that disclosure of the records would shed light on the turf wars 
of the various federal agencies in West Texas. He noted that the drug-runner was 
registered as an informant by one agency while he was being investigated by another 
agency involved in the sting.65 Significant questions existed concerning the proper role of 
law enforcement, its spending priorities and its proclivity for high-profile busts.66  
The court brushed aside these arguments, describing them as a "fishing net" and 
showing far more concern for the potential "stigma" attached to the sheriff (a federal 
convict). It concluded that no records should be released. The court's solicitude for 
criminals is not unusual; Reporters Committee gives great deference to the privacy rights 
of convicted felons. The McNamera court's narrow view of the public interest in an 
investigation featuring a billion dollars' worth of cocaine and a corrupt sheriff also is 
typical of post-Reporters Committee privacy discussions, in which courts attempt to 
divorce personal information from government information and treat the categories as if 
they never overlap. This categorical approach defies logic, as personal information rarely 
can be neatly separated from information about government operations. 
Such an analysis appears counter to the analysis under the Privacy Act concerning 
whether a record is "about" an individual. Under the various approaches to this question 
in the Privacy Act cases, it is clear that personal information -- particularly in the context 
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of criminal investigations, which depend for their very existence upon personal 
information -- can be "about" governmental operations as well as "about" individuals. 
Where the lines between personal and governmental information blur, there must 
be some judicial consideration given to the purpose of the FOIA, as defined by the 
Reporters Committee court: "that the government’s activities be opened to the sharp eye 
of public scrutiny, not that information about private citizens that happens to be in the 
warehouse of the government be so disclosed.”67 The information at issue in McNamera 
clearly does not happen to be in the warehouse of the government. It exists because it is 
about the government's investigation and subsequent conviction of a renegade sheriff for 
a multimillion-dollar drug business.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The Reporters Committee "central purpose" test, as interpreted by the lower 
federal courts, creates the [perhaps] unintended consequence of forestalling any judicial 
analysis into whether the information sought is intended to further knowledge about 
governmental operations. Rather than require courts to engage in the hard work of 
determining whether information sought through FOIA is predominantly "about" 
government or predominantly "about" individuals, the Reporters Committee Court offers 
an either/or proposition. The result is a test that robs the FOIA of much of its impact by 
reflecting the Court's dubious assertion that where governments and individuals collide, 
privacy interests must always triumph. In fact, the opposite may be true, for where 
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governments involve themselves directly in the lives of citizens, the societal interest in 
oversight might be at its greatest. 
The approach of the Tobey court in interpreting the Privacy Act gives greater 
weight to public interest arguments and requires the judiciary to engage in the kind of 
intellectual heavy lifting necessary to resolve conflicts between access and privacy. 
While the Privacy Act is not a perfect parallel to FOIA, it is in many ways a superior 
model, for the Privacy Act was designed not to open governmental records, but to close 
them. That judges interpreting the Privacy Act recognize that information "about" 
individuals sometimes is first and foremost information "about" government is a subtlety 
demanded by these types of cases. Compared to the categorical approach of post-
Reporters Committee FOIA cases, Tobey offers the promise of a more thoughtful 
framework for what has become a truly vexing issue. 
 
 
 
 
 
 The court's analysis in Tobey, though produced in the context of the Privacy Act, 
offers a useful method for resolving similar privacy-related questions in the FOIA 
context.     
 
